The Solution

The way to keep electronic voting fair and secure is the same way we make electronic banking secure: redundant counting and open verification. When you use an ATM, you get a receipt that you can take with you to check against your bank statement. With online banking, you get a verification page that you can print out to compare to your bank statement. At any time, you can call your bank or stop by to verify that an ATM deposit or online payment was made.

Why can’t we do this with voting? Voting machine vendors told us for a long time that it was impossible to put a printer on the touchscreen models. Only after public outcry did vendors agree to attach printers to DREs. ALL touchscreen machines should have a VVPAT.

The best way to make our elections more secure and honest is to hand count paper ballots only, but many election boards resist this idea. The next best thing is to be sure that actual ballots are counted—not “vapor ware” votes in a computer.

Voters should request a paper ballot that can be scanned and/or hand-counted. DREs should be reserved for handicapped voters only, much like handicapped-only parking spaces. Better yet, election boards should purchase voting systems that assist a handicapped voter in marking a paper ballot that can be scanned and/or hand-counted. This can be done without a touchscreen machine.

Lastly, a hand-counted audit of a random sample of votes should be conducted and compared against official totals. If the sample does not match the official count statistically, a hand-conducted recount should be ordered. Currently, there is no law to require this in Missouri or the Kansa s City area.